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Why do states comply with norms of international institutions when those
norms contradict domestic preferences?  Polish domestic political interests
favored preserving Polish autonomy over capital allocation and military
security.  Why then, did the Polish Ministry of Finance abandon bank
consolidation plans in 1996 and privatize its state-owned commercial banks
primarily with foreign capital?  And why did defense officials abandon a
politically popular territorial defense program in 1998 that would have
contributed to Poland’s defense self-sufficiency?
 In  the debates about bank consolidation and territorial defense, the
definition of “national interest” was at stake. These cases show that
definitions of “security maximization” and “economic best practice”
ultimately depend on the social and political context in which those terms
evolve.  Uncertainty and institutional flux characterized the unique period of
post-socialist transition.  Taking advantage of this fluidity, international
institutions, including the Bretton Woods institutions, the European Union
(EU), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), engaged Polish
policy makers with persuasion, social influence, and conditionality in order
to harmonize the national and international articulation of interests.  I will
show how a sequencing model that includes both persuasion and social
influence resulted in matching Polish policy with international institutions’
ideologies.  This led to the internationalization of Polish defense planning
and banking, where internationalization refers to the yielding of national
autonomy to the demands of multinational collective security arrangements
and the global economy, respectively.
Keywords: international relations, Poland, socialization, security/external,
political economy, NATO, economic policy, institutionalisation.INTRODUCTION
Why do states comply with norms of international institutions when those
norms contradict domestic preferences?
*  Polish domestic political interests
favored preserving Polish autonomy over capital allocation and military
security.  Why then, did the Polish Ministry of Finance abandon bank
consolidation plans in 1996 and privatize its state-owned commercial banks
(SOCBs) primarily with foreign capital?  And why did defense officials
abandon a politically popular territorial defense program in 1998 that would
have contributed to Poland’s defense self-sufficiency?
In the debates about bank consolidation and territorial defense, the definition
of “national interest” was at stake. These cases show that definitions of
“security maximization” and “economic best practice” ultimately depend not
only on pre-existing domestic preferences, but also on the international
institutional environment.  In the unique period of policy uncertainty and
institutional flux that characterized transition, international institutions,
including the Bretton Woods institutions, the European Union (EU), and the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), engaged Polish policy makers
with persuasion, social influence, and conditionality in order to harmonize
the national and international articulation of interests.  I will show how a
sequencing model that includes both persuasion and social influence resulted
in matching Polish policy with international institutions’ ideologies.  This
led to the internationalization of Polish defense planning and banking, where
internationalization refers to the yielding of national autonomy to the
demands of multinational collective security arrangements and the global
economy, respectively.
CONSTRUCTIVIST APPROACHES TO NORMATIVE CHANGE
I engage several strains of constructivist scholarship here, all of which
concern the degree to which the “logic of appropriateness” informs behavior.
In its most pristine form, the logic of appropriateness underlies behavior that
is “taken for granted” and is consistent with an actor’s identity.  Such
behavior is guided by a sense of what one “should” do in any given
situation.  This is in contrast to the “logic of consequences” in which an
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actor makes a self-interested cost-benefit calculation and takes a decision on
that basis (March and Olsen 1989; 1998). The distinction is important for
two reasons.  First, constructivists seek to show that there are non-material
forces in the international system that inform states’ behavior.  Second,
presumably, policy that is grounded in beliefs is more sustainable than
policy that results from coercion.
Recent constructivist scholarship focuses on persuasion through social
learning because it is in that political and social micro-process that an actor’s
sense of appropriateness changes (Checkel 2001, 559).  At the other end of
the constructivist spectrum is “strategic social construction” in which policy
makers change their political positions based on external ideational
pressure—from non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or transnational
human rights networks, for example (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse, Ropp
and Sikkink 1999; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998).  The fact that there is no
evidence in such cases that policy makers change their personal convictions,
but rather conform in the face of opposition, puts this version of
constructivist analysis closer to instrumental action (Schimmelfennig 2000a;
2001).
There are at least two additional categories of socially-driven interest
alteration between these two extremes of obligatory and instrumental logic
that do not rely on traditional bargaining or contractual institutionalist forms
of coercion.
1  Alastair Iain Johnston points out that in addition to persuasion,
mechanisms such as shaming, opprobrium, backpatting and cajoling can
encourage actors to change their views.  These are all social categories that
are separate from material incentives that might also change actors’ policy
positions without changing the fundamental convictions of those actors
(Johnston 2001, 488-489 and 494). These forms of social influence may be
categorized as either “mediated informational influence” or “mediated
normative influence.” According to Johnston, mediated informational
influence takes place when an actor believes X before a social interaction,
but upon learning that everyone else believes Y, comes to believe that Y is
the answer because everyone else cannot be wrong.  Mediated normative
influence, on the other hand, is manifested when, before a social interaction,
an actor believes X.  Upon learning that everyone else believes Y, however,
the actor changes his or her public position to Y in order to avoid “rocking
the boat,” even while continuing to believe that X is the answer (Johnston
2001, 499-500).3
One could argue that since, particularly in the case of mediated normative
influence, actors change their public positions without privately accepting
them,
2 that compliance under pressure from social influence is another form
of instrumental action. While the logic is similar to that of contractual
institutionalism, it is also true that effective social influence of this kind
relies on group dynamics, not material incentives.  Since constructivists in
international relations are interested in emphasizing the non-material
structures that inform interstate behavior, these categories of behavior fall
within the bounds of the constructivist ontology (Hopf 1998; Wendt 1999).
Among the most difficult tests for constructivists is to show that persuasion
and social influence affect state behavior even in issue areas that are at the
core of national security.  If Alexander Wendt is correct in asserting that
anarchy in the international system is “what states make of it,” (Wendt 1992)
then it must be possible to socialize states to act in cooperative ways, just as
the international system has at various times socialized states to prioritize
self-preservation and relative gains (Waltz 1979). If constructivists’ basic
claims are correct, international institutions should be able to dissuade states
from pursuing defense self-sufficiency or financial autonomy.  Moreover,
they should be able to do it with mechanisms ranging from persuasion to
social influence.
Checkel and Johnston each propose “scope conditions” under which
persuasion is most likely to occur.
3  Specifying the conditions under which
political outcomes are affected by social learning is an important
contribution to constructivism, but this kind of persuasion in isolation from
other mechanisms is unlikely to lead to policy implementation in the range
of contexts that are of direct concern to students of IR.  Moreover, according
to the scope conditions, persuasion is most likely to take place among actors
who are already politically aligned, thus limiting the analysis to marginal
shifts in policy, rather than dramatic ones.  Finally, although these scope
conditions focus needed attention on micro-processes, they do not reveal
why persuasion leads to macro-normative changes in some instances but not
others.  Given these limitations in the existing literature, what we need now
is an integrated approach to understanding persuasion’s role in policy
implementation that reflects the socializing effect of international
organizations.  Understanding the systematic relationship between
persuasion and social influence will allow us to predict what conditions
contribute to the sustainability of policy implementation.4
A SEQUENCING APPROACH TO PERUASION AND POLICY
IMPLEMENTATION
International institutions, including the Bretton Woods institutions, the EU,
and NATO, internationalized Polish financial and defense policy primarily
through setting the terms of debate and defining what constituted “rational”
policy solutions.  Western advisers enjoyed enormous ideological power in
the wake of the cold war.  In the financial sphere, they used their
authoritative positions as well as the massive policy failure represented by
state-socialism’s collapse to privilege a narrow set of policy prescriptions
that favored the market mechanism as a means of resolving political conflict.
In the military-security sphere, NATO promoted both democratic control
over the armed forces in postcommunist states, and equally important, a
conciliatory tone toward the Soviet Union and later, Russia.  By the mid-
1990s, these same institutions, in cooperation with Polish pro-Western
reformers, delegitimized Polish domestic policy proposals that contradicted
these principles by shaming and isolating their advocates.
Cooperation rather than conflict characterized interaction between Polish
policy makers and their foreign advisers during the first phase of transition
(1989-1993).  This should not obscure the fact that international institutions
were exercising their influence during this period in profound ways through
the provision of ideas.  In addition, they were, primarily through social
learning, building political coalitions with those sympathetic to their
approach to reform and gaining knowledge about local conditions.  Both
processes contributed to the capacity of foreign advisors and their Polish
interlocutors in the second phase of transition (1994-1998) to use social
influence to encourage the abandonment of programs that were at odds with
the international institutions’ own ideologies.
International institutions used two modes of agenda-setting in these
respective phases of transition to cultivate Polish interests in favor of
internationalizing solutions to policy dilemmas.  The first was the provision
of ideas (Evangelista 1999).  Western experts dispense “technical advice” as
politically neutral, particularly concerning economic policy (Kirshner
forthcoming).  Such assistance is ideological, however, in so far as it is a
unified, coherent, value-laden program with distributional consequences.
Technical experts nevertheless portray their assistance as politically neutral,
not as a duplicitous act, but because they themselves take the values
embedded in their policy prescriptions for granted.  In this way, international5
institutions relocate debate from whether outcomes that they prefer are
desirable to the methods of achieving those outcomes.
The second mode of agenda setting (more common in the Polish case during
the second phase of transition), is “organizing bias,”
4 also known as
“alternative specification” (Schoppa 1997).
5 This is the process by which
international institutions organize certain conflicts into politics.  By
characterizing a condition as problematic, international institutions provoke
a domestic debate that local politicians would not necessarily have engaged
in otherwise.  Further, by weighing in on one side of the debate and
organizing social interactions to persuade domestic actors to join their side,
international institutions change the domestic balance of power in favor of
their own position.
I propose four scope conditions that explain domestic compliance with
international institutional norms, even when those norms expressly
contradict domestic priorities.  The scope conditions all concern the degree
to which international institutions are able to control the domestic debate.  A
key part of the theoretical framework is the path-dependent, sequencing
nature of the scope conditions.
Phase One: Explaining Social Learning
Consistent with both Johnston’s and Checkel’s findings, persuasion through
social learning is an essential element in the political process.  This kind of
persuasion is most likely to occur in the wake of policy failure when the
targets of persuasion have few prior assumptions about how best to
formulate policy.  In transition states, these conditions are most likely to
prevail early in transition.  Second, persuasion is most likely to occur when
the persuader is an authoritative member of an organization from which the
target actor would like to win social affirmation or approval.
Phase Two: Explaining Policy Implementation
The third hypothesis I propose addresses the conditions under which
persuasion then translates into policy implementation (and continuity of a
particular policy after implementation).  Policy implementation that is
consistent with international institutional ideologies will take place if foreign
advisors cultivate transnational coalitions that include politically-positioned
domestic actors.  By activating these transnational coalitions, foreign6
advisors can use mechanisms of social influence to ensure policy continuity.
Social influence may take place in either public or private settings and it
may include coercive measures.  Nevertheless, it is social influence, rather
than bargaining in the contractual institutionalist sense, precisely because it
is the sense of political isolation that persuades actors to comply with
international institutional demands.  Domestic participation in such
coalitions is important because it contributes to the legitimacy of
international institutions’ claims that their programs are not externally
imposed.
Finally, my fourth hypothesis is that policy implementation consistent with
the ideas and interests of international institutions is most likely when the
targets of social influence aspire to membership in international institutions
with exclusive ideologies.  Ideological consistency between national policy
and international institutions is crucial to domestic actors whose political
legitimacy depends on international recognition.
The advantage of this approach is that it can explain both marginal and
radical policy shifts in directions consistent with a persuader’s ideas and
interests.  Second, clearly not all actors within a domestic political setting
are socialized either to the same degree or at the same time.  Given the
inevitable differences in the pace and depth of socialization, this approach
nevertheless explains why policy implementation takes place.  Third, the
hypotheses taken together are also suggestive of the kind of institutional
arrangements that result in enduring policy change.  International institutions
that have fixed ideologies constrain the programmatic basis on which
national figures can mobilize political support because some degree of
matching national and international institutional political programs is central
to politicians’ legitimacy.  This is especially true where domestic programs
are under constant international scrutiny.  In Poland, policy makers, even
those of different political parties and platforms, had an ever shrinking range
of policy options over time because of that country’s early engagement of
international institutions’ financial and ideological support.
METHODOLOGY: IDENTIFYING PERSUASION AND SOCIAL
INFLUENCE
The purest form of persuasion or social learning is characterized by
internally motivated agreement with the persuader.  The difficulty in
measuring the degree of persuasion is that there are few definitive external7
indicators of when persuasion has taken place.  Actors may claim that the
persuader has successfully changed their views, but whether the target actor
has internalized those views is difficult to discern.  This methodological
dilemma exacerbates the problem of distinguishing between constructivist
and rationalist categories of analysis.
In interviews with policy makers, it is easier to identify strategic behavior
(the logic of consequences) than norm-driven behavior (the logic of
appropriateness) because politically, actors may have incentives to conceal
their personal convictions if they are at odds with the prevailing ideology.
Nevertheless, there are ways of determining whether an actor has changed
his or her public position with or without private acceptance.  I have used
interview data to compare Polish politicians’ positions on issues after
interactions with international institutions with earlier written statements on
the same issues.  In the interviews, I asked what the policy makers’ current
positions were, both publicly and privately, in addition to the reasons behind
their positions.  Normative consistency in their answers with the policy
positions of the international institutions that had prompted change indicated
a change in view.  Irony concerning the policy positions of international
institutions that objected to Polish domestic preferences suggested public
conformity with a set of ideas that had not won private acceptance with the
interviewee.  Similarly, a policy-maker’s private rejection of an international
institutions’ policy agenda co-existing with public conformity to the same
international institution’s program clearly indicated some other reason for
compliance than persuasion in its most pristine form.
Discerning the motivations behind policy positions is important for
specifying the conditions under which social, as opposed to material,
incentives, elicit change.  However, my argument about under what
conditions persuasion translates into policy implementation and
sustainability relies as heavily on the institutionalization of exclusive
ideologies through domestic public policy as it does on proving that an
actor’s personal convictions have changed.  That is why, in the presentation
of evidence, I stress what Polish policy makers state publicly, not just
whether it was persuasion, social influence, or coercion that produced such
statements.  Once policy makers institutionalize a particular portrayal of the
national interest that is consistent with the international institutional
environment, it becomes increasingly difficult to propose competing ideas
(i.e. that it was the Polish state’s role to protect Polish control over domestic
capital allocation or that Russia was the primary threat to national security).8
Institutionalization of public policy that mirrors international norms, which
are themselves embedded in the international environment, limits the bases
on which politicians can mobilize domestic political support.
EVIDENCE 1: THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE
BANKING SECTOR IN POSTCOMMUNIST POLAND
Why, despite domestic interests to the contrary, did Poland privatize the
majority of its banking assets with foreign capital?  Similarly, why did
Poland forgo the opportunity to build a Polish-owned banking conglomerate
that would have been internationally competitive?  By the year 2000, 70% of
Poland’s banking assets were foreign owned.  Given the range of options at
the outset of transition, one might have expected a wide-ranging debate
about the possible ways of organizing the banking sector, but there was in
fact little discussion about the merits of maintaining a role for the state in
domestic credit allocation in Poland in the first years of transition.  After the
1993 elections, when postcommunist politicians introduced competing ideas
that suggested the state should play a directive role in economic
development, international financial institutions, including the IMF, the
World Bank, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(EBRD), narrowed the scope of debate and limited the policy options
available to Polish politicians.
The privileging of foreign investment and the abandonment of bank
consolidation plans are surprising outcomes for three reasons.  First,
according to earlier research on the structure of finance and the development
of the state, late developers tend to use state capacity to marshal and
coordinate national resources in an effort to catch up.  With control over
credit, the state apparatus may be able to employ “leap-frog” techniques, in
which economically less developed states can accelerate development by
importing technology.
6  Second, a range of historical experience shows that
under some conditions, particularly with regard to strategic sectors such as
finance, the state may be able to improve upon the efficiency of markets
(Haggard and Lee 1993, 11-13).  Most economic success stories of the post-
war period include cases of centralized credit allocation.  Third, from a
political perspective, states have often considered it advantageous to protect
their banking sectors from foreign ownership.  Independent sources of
finance help bolster state autonomy.9
The scope of Poland’s embrace of the market is also surprising given
American and West European reluctance to make their own banking sectors
available to foreign ownership.  These are, after all, the models that Poland
was striving to emulate in the postcommunist transition. Although OECD
countries putatively have market access to one another’s banking sectors,
there is de facto protection, such that on average, only between 10 and 20
percent of most OECD banking assets are foreign owned (Godula 2000, 4;
Economist 28/8/1999, 58).
7  States have traditionally protected this strategic
sector from foreign ownership in order to preserve international
competitiveness, even in the midst of European integration.  Since foreign
ownership of Polish banking assets approached 60% in 1999, Polish
observers, concerned about foreign ownership, have noted that foreign banks
will make business decisions based on economic conditions in the home
country.  This has raised the fear among Poles that if Polish enterprises seek
financing for a sector that is in direct competition with the same sector in the
financing bank’s home country, that bank will in turn fail to make the loan
(Godula 2000).
The Twinning Arrangements
Despite these domestic political reservations about selling this strategic
sector to foreign investors, international institutions and the first wave of
Solidarity reformers set that trajectory together beginning in 1990.  Although
the Bretton Woods institutions began advising Poland on financial reform
much earlier (1986), the opportunity for dramatic change obviously widened
with the first partially-free Polish elections in 1989. One of the first foreign
interventions with regard to banking reform occurred in late 1989 at a
conference on the outskirts of Warsaw.
8  Jeffrey Sachs, who would later
figure prominently in Poland’s macroeconomic stabilization plan by
providing a Harvard economist’s imprimatur, made a number of sweeping
remarks about the imperative of modernizing and privatizing Poland’s
banks.  He suggested that the Polish government enlist the financial
assistance of the international financial institutions to finance a training
program between Western and Polish banks.  Theoretically, this would be a
way of providing Polish banks with Western know-how, while
simultaneously generating interest among Western banks in investing in
their Polish counterparts.
Later that same day, Stefan Kawalec, whom Balcerowicz had appointed to
General Director in the Polish Ministry of Finance in charge of banking10
reform, contacted Anthony Doran.  At that time, Doran was the International
Finance Corporation’s (IFC) chief in Warsaw.  Having both been at Sachs’
talk earlier that day, Kawalec and Doran met in Warsaw to discuss the
feasibility of setting up a training program along the lines that Sachs had
suggested.  A year later, in the spring of 1991, the “Twinning
Arrangements” were announced, although the training had already been
underway for some months.  The World Bank, initially critical of the
concept, later adopted it as its own at the IFC’s urging.  The World Bank
then funded the bulk of the project, and began planning the expansion of the
program into other countries.
Consequences of the Twinning Arrangements
From the perspective of encouraging relationships between Western and
Polish banks that would result in investment, the Twinning Arrangements
were only modestly successful.  One bank, Allied Irish, invested in its
“twin” in Poznan, Wielki Bank Polski S.A. (WBP), while none of the other
partnerships materialized directly into business ventures between partners
(McCrossan 2001, 21-22). However, both the Italians and Dutch
(UniCredito and ING) did invest elsewhere in Poland’s banking sector at
later dates.
9
The fact that the Twinning Arrangements were voluntary and mostly
unsuccessful obscures their broader political ramifications.  The partnering
program was legitimate not for the proven quality of the idea,
10 but because
of its origins.  The debate about the course of banking reform was set in
terms of privatization, with foreign investors being privileged in that
scenario.  At this stage, there was no debate about commercialization under
state control before privatization, an alternative that only emerged with the
return of the postcommunists to power in Poland in 1993.  These ideas about
how best to modernize Poland’s banking sector were also significant in the
next stage of banking reform.  Kawalec, the central figure in organizing the
Twinning Arrangements on the Polish side, was later also instrumental in
designing the bank bailout plan that relied heavily on foreign ideological,
technical and financial assistance, as well as domestic preferences.
The Twinning Arrangements were significant for the way in which they
typified many transnational coalitions between Poles and international
institutions in the first phase of transition. Early in transition, in the wake of
state socialism’s massive policy failure, Polish policy makers were quite11
open to persuasion.  Having studied markets but having never constructed
them, Solidarity reformers had little of their own expertise, although they did
want to undermine the state’s power.  Moreover, the persuaders in this case
were representatives of authoritative organizations whose approval Polish
reformers sought.  Thus, the international financial institutions cultivated a
coalition of pro-market reformers within the Polish Ministry of Finance that
would later act as legitimate purveyors of the international financial
institutions’ arguments when those ideas came under attack from domestic
sources.  The Twinning Arrangements were also significant for the way in
which they allowed international financial institutions and foreign investors
to structure the debate in Poland about how best to bring the Polish banking
sector into technological conformity with their Western counterparts.
According to one World Bank official,
we wanted to see this market become as competitive as possible, as quickly as
possible. . .we were not wedded to the idea that domestic ownership have
priority—not at all. . .I think in this vein the World Bank and others chose not to
understand what the implications of this approach were for the local market and
government.
11
Bank Bailout and Restructuring: Securing Foreign Assistance
As was true in all east European economies in the early 1990’s, Poland’s
banking sector faced a debt crisis in 1990 and 1991.  With the onset of
macroeconomic stabilization in Poland on January 1, 1990, otherwise known
as “Shock Therapy,” enterprise exposure to market forces and the
consequent drop in output led to a significant proportion of non-performing
loans.
12  Many of the major banks became technically insolvent.  In response
to the crisis, Polish reformers called on several of the international financial
institutions, including the IFC, the World Bank, the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, (EBRD) and the IMF for technical advice.
After devising a bailout and restructuring plan, the Polish Ministry of
Finance applied for financial assistance to many of the same institutions.
13
In conjunction with the bank bailout program that Kawalec had devised, the
Polish government sought out two sources of foreign financial assistance.
The first was a World Bank loan called the Enterprise and Financial Sector
Assistance Loan (EFSAL) of $400 million.
14  The IMF provided the second
source of foreign financial assistance.  In 1990, the IMF had set aside a $1
billion zloty stabilization fund in connection with the onset of “shock12
therapy” macroeconomic stabilization.  The fund was never used for that
purpose, however.  In light of the looming banking crisis, the Polish
Ministry of Finance proposed using the stabilization fund to recapitalize the
state-owned banks.  The IMF attached one informal condition to the
arrangement: that the Polish government make a good faith effort to
privatize the remaining state owned banks by 1996.  Because the Polish
politicians in power at this time were free-market enthusiasts from
Solidarity, whom the international financial institutions (IFIs) had already
persuaded of the efficiency of the market, they welcomed this conditionality.
In October 1993, with the Polish communists’ return to power (the
Democratic Left Alliance SLD and the Polish Peasant Party PSL), a new set
of ideas regarding the restructuring Poland’s banking sector entered the
debate.  According to Grzegorz Kolodko, the new SLD Minister of Finance,
the rush to privatize Poland’s banks was a mistake.
15  Kolodko believed that
there was no technical reason to privatize state-owned enterprises sooner
rather than later.  He pointed out that there was no correlation between a
country’s rate of privatization and its economic performance.
16  Further, he
argued that rapid privatization would complicate the process of institution-
building that is essential to enhancing the state’s regulatory capacity.
Finally, he maintained that rapid privatization of Poland’s banks would
mean the de facto sale to foreign interests because early in transition, the
domestic market had not yet evolved to a point of being able to absorb such
investments—it was still too capital-poor.
Kolodko wanted to commercialize some of the state-owned banks,
consolidate them, and postpone their privatization for two reasons.  The first
was that if privatization were carried out rapidly, the enterprise would not
have reached its potential value, thus cutting into the state’s revenue from
the sale.  The second was that rapid privatization in Poland’s transition
economy would have precluded the possibility of Polish investment in the
banking sector because at that time there was insufficient domestic capital to
absorb the enterprises.  By postponing privatization, Kolodko hoped to
fulfill two developmental goals.  The first was to maintain the state’s role in
credit allocation.  The second was to eventually create a Polish-owned
internationally competitive banking conglomerate.
Consolidation under state direction would have had to be completed quickly,
however, in order to privatize on terms favorable to maintaining Polish
ownership.  Given Poland’s aspirations to join the OECD and the EU, the13
country would eventually have to comply with a number of market access
rules.
17  In addition, the 1991 Council of Ministers decree that set a 30%
limit on any single foreign investor in any single bank would be lifted in
1997 in accordance with Poland’s European Union Association Agreement
(Warsaw Business Journal 24/11/1995, 1).
The government’s plans to consolidate several of Poland’s banks in late
1995 caused an outcry.  Aside from the domestic complaint that the Ministry
of Finance was trying to “pick winners” and therewith subvert market logic,
one of the banks slated for consolidation had already been partly privatized.
Bank Przemyslowo-Handlowy of Krakow (BPH) was in large part divided
between 4 major shareholders, including the Polish State Treasury (46.6%),
the EBRD (15.06%), ING Bank (10.1%), Daiwa (4.57%).  In addition, GE
Capital as well as other Polish banks had expressed interest in investing in
BPH not long before the consolidation announcement.  Although the
proposed move by the Ministry of Finance would have been technically
legal, opposition was intense (Warsaw Business Journal 8/12/1995, 3).
When officials at the U.S. Treasury, including at that time Lawrence
Summers, David Lipton and Robert Rubin, learned of the SLD’s bank
consolidation plans, they took action to persuade Kolodko to drop the
program.
18  In a private meeting with Kolodko in Washington, D.C., they
argued that state-led consolidation was at odds with basic principles of a
market economy.  State-orchestrated plans such as these were anti-
competitive.  This was especially problematic in Poland, they argued, where
it was the post-communists who were pursuing policies that resembled
central planning of the previous era, as well as protectionist policies
designed to favor domestic, over foreign, investors.  The U.S. Treasury
warned that this would raise concerns among foreign investors more
generally.  Further, they argued that the Polish government could not afford
to potentially slow the privatization of state-owned enterprises in light of the
government’s budgetary priorities.  Finally, the U.S. Treasury, contending
bank consolidation was not in the spirit of the earlier agreement to privatize
all the state-owned banks by 1996, threatened to withhold the next tranche of
recapitalization funds.
Kolodko also received damaging press coverage.  The foreign business press
quoted critics who called the plan a “collectivization move,” who further
compared it to 1945 “when the communists gave peasants small pieces of
land, only to take them back again” (Warsaw Business Journal 8/12/1995,14
3). A journalist from Poland’s leading newspaper, Gazeta Wyborcza, which
was founded by Solidarity activists, asked Kolodko at a press conference in
Washington why he was “re-communizing” Poland’s banks.
19
In 1996, Kolodko and the SLD dropped the bulk of the bank consolidation
plans.
20  But the intensity of the conflict with the IMF and the U.S. Treasury
over the issue and the political damage unleashed by the press led to a series
of policy changes well beyond the scope of the consolidation issue.  Not
only did the SLD drop bank consolidation, but they also initiated a fast-track
privatization scheme for the banks that had previously been slated for
consolidation, and sought out foreign capital for the task.  Further, they used
the revenue from those privatizations to implement a tax cut.  In addition, in
light of the political outcry against consolidation, SLD deputies in the
Parliament sponsored legislation outlawing the consolidation of any bank
that was not 100% state-owned.  This was largely a symbolic act given the
small number of banks remaining that would fit that criterion.  Finally,
Kolodko went on to become a visiting scholar at IMF headquarters in
Washington, D.C. after his tenure as Polish Minister of Finance ended.
Abandonment of Bank Consolidation: Mediated Normative Influence
The SLD’s abandonment of bank consolidation, and with it hopes for an
internationally competitive banking conglomerate that could be subject to
state influence, is a case of mediated normative influence.  Kolodko believed
that state control over domestic credit allocation was a potentially powerful
developmental tool.  He continued to believe this in the wake of the
confrontation with both domestic opposition and the IMF, EBRD, and U.S.
Treasury.  However, because the political pressure threatened to portray him
as an unreconstructed communist in a country where state-socialism had
been thoroughly discredited, he chose to comply with IFI norms that defend
the validity of the market as a preferred means of resolving political conflict.
The political turmoil surrounding the bank consolidation plans did not occur
in isolation, however.  Those events and the political response to them were
a consequence of previous phases of persuasion, coalition-building, and
monetary agreements.  When the Bretton Woods institutions and the EBRD
lent financial support to Poland’s bank restructuring, they did so with an
exclusive ideology that is guided by market principles.  Thus, even as
electoral politics in Poland signaled a domestic desire to change course with
the victory of postcommunist parties in 1993, the international institutions’15
previous structuring of debates that were consolidated in financial
agreements limited the degree to which Polish politicians could subsequently
alter the liberalizing course.
Although Kolodko did face the prospect of losing the $200 million
remaining that U.S. Treasury officials threatened to withhold if the Polish
government had gone forward with bank consolidation, this is not a case of
simple coercion.  There are three pieces of evidence that counter the strictly
materialist interpretation of this outcome.  First, Kolodko himself
emphasized the wide-ranging nature of the political pressure he faced.
Second, if funding had been the only consideration, it is likely the Polish
government could have financed the remaining recapitalization because the
$400 million that the Sejm had legislated for emergency adjustment
assistance to sensitive enterprises was provided by the World Bank instead.
Finally, the SLD’s full policy reversal after confrontation with the IMF, the
EBRD, and U.S. Treasury, not just on bank consolidation, but also on bank
privatization and taxation, suggests that the conflict elicited a more market-
oriented approach from the postcommunist government.  Thus the money
carried significant symbolic weight, but more important was the social
pressure that delimited  the range of policies that could be portrayed as pro-
capitalist and pro-Western.
EVIDENCE 2: THE ABANDONMENT OF TERRITORIAL
DEFENSE IN POLAND
Poland’s abandonment of territorial defense ( Obrona Terytorialna--OT)
shows that approaches that assume the national interest is exogenous
obscure the political process through which interests come into being.
Interest formation in this case highlights two additional effects of NATO’s
intervention in Polish defense planning.  NATO changed the balance of
power between competing groups in Polish politics and society,
undermining nationalist, militaristic, and arms producing constituents (also
see Dragsdahl 1998).  In addition, it has softened the rhetoric among Polish
politicians about the eastern threat to Polish security and internationalized
Polish defense planning in addressing security challenges.  This has
prevented a security dilemma from arising between Warsaw and Moscow.
A narrower range of defense planning policy options enjoys legitimacy
within Poland than would otherwise have been the case.  In particular,
NATO, through persuasion and social influence, weakened the coherence of16
arguments that derived their credibility from a perceived need to restore
Poland’s defense self-sufficiency.
Territorial Defense in the Post-Communist Period
Obrona Terytorialna (OT) was a national defense program championed by
members of the Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS) coalition and members of
the conservative Polish Peasant Party (PSL).  Leading up to the 1997
parliamentary elections in Poland, the AWS began suggesting that Poland
halt further contraction of the armed forces.  When communism collapsed,
the Polish armed forces numbered 400,000.  As NATO membership became
a reality, that number was consistently shifted downward.  In 1997, with a
projected 250,000 soldiers serving in the army, as many as 150,000 would
be assigned to territorial defense.  In addition, this program would have
included the capacity to mobilize 1.5 million conscript reservists who would
have undergone 3 months of training ( Gazeta Wyborcza 15/9/1997, 5).
Armed with mobile grenade launchers, antitank and antiaircraft rockets,
mines, and other small arms, a “mass component” of the Polish armed forces
would be responsible for defending the territory around their residences
(Rzeczpospolita 1/9/1997, 7).
Territorial defense reached beyond perceived technical defense needs,
however.  Proponents of the plan believed that national defense “prepared
and functioning at peacetime, is a sort of tool used to create, shape, and
define the future of the Polish State” (Rzeczpospolita 1/9/1997, 1).  As such,
proponents of territorial defense conceived of the program as incorporating
the entire society.  Their aim was to dispel the notion that national defense is
the exclusive domain of governing officials and the armed forces.  One
defense expert argued, for example, that the “conviction that the people’s
authorities and their armed forces guarantee security to the state and to the
nation, and that the armed forces are a guarantor of our independence. . .is
absolute nonsense” ( Rzeczpospolita 14-15/8/1997, 4).
21  Instead, territorial
defense is believed by its supporters to require the participation of all social
institutions ( Polska Zbrojna 28/3/1997, 11-12). Moreover, advocates have
proposed that universal military education be introduced in secondary
schools to cultivate “patriotic awareness” among Polish citizens ( Gazeta
Wyborcza 21/4/1998, 3).17
The arguments in favor of territorial defense centered on the need to develop
an independent defense capability.  NATO’s Military Committee had put the
threat of a Russian resurgent military capability below “regional instability,
rogue states and calamities associated with a lack of natural resources”
(Dragsdahl 1998, 2). Many Polish defense experts, however, including a
number of high-ranking military officers and defense and foreign policy
officials, argued that although the threat of global conflict had diminished,
“this does not mean it can be ruled out altogether” ( Polska Zbrojna
2/1/1998, 10-11). Sitting between Germany and Russia, Poland,  OT
advocates argued, “lies on the border of two areas with totally different
cultural, social, and economic traditions. . .” which, although presenting
“great economic opportunities. . .also means that there is possibility of a
serious threat” (Rzeczpospolita 14-15/8/1997, 4).
The literature supporting the development of territorial defense persistently
reveals a fundamental doubt in the credibility of NATO’s commitment to
central and east Europe ( Gazeta Wyborcza 12/2/1997, 5;  Rzeczpospolita
1/9/1997, 7).
22  Romuald Szeremietiew, a long-time Polish defense official
who began serving as Deputy Defense Minister after the 1997 national
elections, conceded that “Although the alliance with NATO is favorably
different from Poland’s military unions with Great Britain and France [in the
past] the old mentality remains intact: we cannot manage without the West”
(Rzeczpospolita 22/1/1998, 6).  Territorial defense was an appeal to reverse
that mentality.  Supporters discussed the program in terms of hedging
against future uncertainty.  The longevity of NATO and the depth of its
security commitment in combination with wariness concerning
developments in the East, particularly in Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus,
fueled the desires among the most cautious to develop an independent
defense capability.
23
Others complained that as of 1997, there were no agreed-upon plans for the
defense of NATO’s eastern flank, which was evidence of the uncertainty
inherent in the transitional phase of the alliance.
24  Finally, fluctuating
estimates of the costs of NATO enlargement (the Pentagon and the U.S.
Congressional Budget Office produced very different figures) undermined
the credibility of NATO’s security guarantee in the eyes of Poles.  This
uncertainty pushed some in the Polish defense-planning establishment to
consider what would be necessary to defend Poland, as opposed to what was
financially feasible.
2518
The process of negotiation and reconciliation with NATO actually began in
1991 and 1992, five years before territorial defense became an issue in
Polish politics. Although NATO officials initially made it clear that
enlargement was not in the offing, by late 1992, the alliance’s position had
softened (De Wijk 1997).  As NATO moved closer to Poland and began
introducing formal and informal channels of communication and
cooperation, a conflict of ideas and strategies emerged.  Polish politicians
were insistent on membership, both because they wanted to “return” to the
West, and because they wanted protection against Russian revanchism,
should that materialize (Grayson 1999, 161-162).
From their earliest meetings with Polish defense and foreign policy officials,
however, NATO officials began coaching Polish politicians about how to
justify their position.
26  NATO officials argued that contrary to Polish
insistence, Russia did not pose a significant threat to Polish or alliance
security.  Although alliance officials were willing to concede that the future
was uncertain, they also argued that Poland would alienate itself from the
alliance and exacerbate its relations with Russia if it continued to articulate
its need to join NATO in terms of securing itself against the East.  Not only
did this advice from NATO reflect the alliance’s evolving strategic vision,
but it also reflected its desire to cultivate conciliatory relations with
Moscow.  NATO would not be able to persuade Russia that NATO
enlargement was not directed against Russian interests if potential members
insisted that Russia continued to pose a threat to European stability.
27
As a consequence of this coaching, Polish politicians changed their rhetoric
about why they should be admitted to the alliance.  In subsequent public
pronouncements, they emphasized the need for democratic values, increased
transparency, defense cooperation, and political stability, both within Poland
and within the region.  All of these were justifications that NATO officials
had told them privately would be appropriate reasons for Poland’s
inclusion.
28  Eventually, Poles who had never had direct contact with the
alliance in the post-cold war era articulated these more moderate views that
focused on Poland’s internal stability and modernization.
29  Although in this
phase of the transition NATO was able to change the way Poles articulated
threat perceptions and appropriate responses, the process of negotiation did
not eliminate the perceived desirability among the most conservative
political forces in Poland of some degree of defense self-sufficiency.19
International and Domestic Opposition to Territorial Defense
NATO objected to Polish territorial defense on several grounds.  The
program, and the ways in which its supporters were popularizing it, called
the credibility of NATO security guarantees into question.  Second, as
already noted, it was perceived by the alliance to be antagonistic toward
Russia.  Third, NATO officials questioned the efficacy of territorial defense.
In the post-cold war era with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and conflict
in the Balkans, NATO’s mission had changed considerably from defending
Western European territory from Soviet aggression.  The newest Strategic
Concept placed emphasis on building the capacity to conduct “out-of-area”
operations. This requires that member states develop light and
technologically sophisticated units that are highly mobile and deployable to
any point in Europe or on its periphery.  This conflict of security perceptions
speaks to the issue of what constitutes a threat to Polish and NATO security,
as well as to what, from Poland’s past, was still valid for the present.
30
Polish opponents of the program argued that the larger questions of Poland’s
foreign policy orientation and the mentality of its fighting forces were at
stake. Philosophically, Polish foreign policy and defense elites who are most
supportive of rapid integration with NATO and fulfilling the alliance’s
agenda argued that more than defense dollars were at stake.  One foreign
policy expert was critical of territorial defense, not only on the basis of its
technical incompatibility with NATO, but because the program is associated
with elements in Polish politics that favor political neutrality and defense
self-sufficiency.
31  Internationalist politicians in Poland fear that territorial
defense would result in the militarization of society and the resurgence of
the idea of “Wielka Polska” (Great Poland).
32
NATO’s Tactics: Reversing the Policy
In closed-door meetings, NATO representatives, in delegations to Poland
and to the Polish delegation in Brussels, repeatedly stressed that they would
prefer that Poland focus on the basic issues of integration and compatibility
with the alliance rather than expending effort and resources on territorial
defense.  They argued that because Poland did not, for example, have a
single transport vehicle capable of moving troops,
33 it was of no
consequence how economical territorial defense would be relative to
operational forces; every defense dollar should be allocated to modernizing20
and equipping NATO-capable forces.
34  The message was clear and
consistent enough that it was well known around the Polish Ministry of
Defense in Warsaw that there was a definitive clash of interests, and that OT
had become a sensitive subject.
35  In much the same way NATO officials
had argued that justifying Polish membership in the alliance with the
Russian threat did not serve Polish interests, NATO officials claimed in this
case that Polish supporters of  OT  misunderstood both the realities and
demands of Poland’s geostrategic position.
These multiple encounters between NATO and Polish officials, although
raising awareness that  OT was controversial, proved insufficient by
themselves to change Polish policy.  The U.S. embassy, in cooperation with
at least one Polish critic of territorial defense, arranged a meeting with
Polish Deputy Minister of Defense, Romuald Szeremietiew, in early 1998.
36
He was, following the election, the most powerful civilian official who
supported the program.
37  A conservative member of Solidarity Election
Action (AWS), Szeremietiew “passionately invokes the feeling of civil duty
and does not hesitate to hit a patriotic cord” in his public speeches and
writings promoting the program.
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In the meeting with Szeremietiew at the U.S. embassy in Warsaw, NATO
officials emphasized a number of points.  First, they were meeting with
Szeremietiew directly to provide assurances that regardless of historical
precedent set by Poland’s Western allies, NATO would not abandon a
member state in a time of need.  Second, they argued that Russia did not
pose either a short or medium term threat, but that NATO would
nevertheless continue to assess the situation and adapt its strategy
accordingly.  Finally, given these facts, NATO argued that it was
unnecessary for Poland to pursue territorial defense.  In addition to these
substantive arguments, the meeting included a forceful message.  In what
one U.S. official who was present described as a “hard” encounter,
American officials told Szeremietiew that he should not pursue the plan.  It
was not compatible with NATO’s top priorities at this time, and thus out of
step with Poland’s interests.  There were many other more constructive
projects Szeremietiew could promote while in office, NATO officials
pointed out. They urged him, “don’t do this.”
39  Shortly thereafter, he
stopped pursuing the plan, although there was no formal public admission
that OT was inconsistent with NATO objectives.21
Subsequent to these events, Szeremietiew denied that OT had ever been in
conflict with NATO.  Substantially altering the original intent behind
territorial defense, he re-articulated the once-perceived need for  OT as
consistent with NATO aims, and explained its abandonment exclusively in
terms of domestic debates and budgetary constraints.  He also explained,
however, with some irony, that Poland in recent years had become a “gentle
country.”  For example, he pointed out that although Belarus continued to
conduct military exercises that would appear to be directed against Poland,
Poland, because of its membership in NATO, would not conduct counter-
exercises.
40
Abandonment of Territorial Defense: Mediated Informational Influence
The U.S. embassy in Warsaw achieved the territorial defense policy reversal
in what appeared to be a single, crucial meeting.  However, the alliance had
been creating the conditions necessary to encourage Szeremietiew to drop
the plan over a period of years.  It was high level German and American
officials who first suggested to Polish defense officials in 1991 that
appropriate diplomatic gestures might strengthen their ties to NATO.  From
that time forward, Polish representatives were open to persuasion on a range
of issues, including Poland’s potential role in NATO, civil-military relations,
justifications for membership, and collective security.
Dynamics between NATO and the Polish military-defense establishment in
1991 and 1992 do not definitively confirm the first hypothesis, namely that
persuasion is most likely in the wake of policy failure when the persuadee
has few prior assumptions about how to structure policy.  The military did
not face as severe a policy failure in the wake of state-socialism as economic
sectors did.  Moreover, although Polish civilians had few cognitive priors
about the technicalities of organizing civil-military relations (all the defense
experts under state-socialism had been military personnel) they certainly did
have cognitive priors about Poland’s national interests and its geostrategic
position.
The second hypothesis, that persuasion is more likely to occur when the
persuader is an authoritative member of an organization from which the
persuadee seeks acceptance, explains why this early set of Polish defense
reformers accepted NATO’s strategic vision and collection security.
However, it is important to note that the early set of reformers was not
persuaded uniformly.  Some admitted that they took NATO’s position22
publicly, especially concerning Russia, but privately held different
convictions.
41  Others, however, wanted to use NATO’s model as a tool for
modernizing Polish society, even if membership in the alliance was never in
the offing.
42  What they did have in common, however, and what proved
crucial to the defeat of territorial defense five years later, was that they all
remained committed to articulating NATO’s ideology once it became clear
that the alliance objected to OT.  This was true even after NATO had
promised Poland inclusion in the first round of enlargement, thus in the
absence of any material or membership incentive.
This leads to the third and fourth hypotheses concerning policy
implementation and policy sustainability.  International institutions are able
to use transnational coalitions that they have cultivated with domestic actors
to exercise social influence.  At the Madrid summit in July 1997, NATO
formally invited Poland to join.  This fact coupled with the repeated contacts
in Brussels and Warsaw where NATO officials voiced their doubts about the
utility and compatibility of territorial defense increased Szeremietiew’s
political isolation over time.  This was particularly true within the Ministry
of Defense where even the Minister of Defense, Janusz Onyszkiewicz,
expressed no enthusiasm for the plan.  In addition, although editorials that
were critical of OT continued to appear in 1998, the key erstwhile supporters
of the program had fallen silent on the issue, including Jan Parys, Radek
Sikorski, and Bronislaw Komorowski.  Although Parys and Sikorski were
still privately sympathetic to the idea in 1999, they were no longer
submitting editorials to mobilize support for the program.
This is in all likelihood a case of mediated informational influence, although
the evidence is not conclusive.  Szeremietiew probably changed his position
as a consequence of being politically isolated and because he reached the
conclusion that given what everyone else believed about Poland’s security
situation, he must be wrong.  As Poland’s ties to NATO grew stronger, as
contacts increased, and particularly because NATO invited Poland to join
the alliance, defense self-sufficiency enthusiasts’ claims that Poland needed
an elaborate territorial defense seemed increasingly untenable.  These claims
would have been far more sustainable had NATO chosen not to include
Poland in the enlargement.  In an interview, Szeremietiew admitted only to
having been persuaded that OT would not be cost effective.
Two pieces of puzzling evidence suggest this might instead be mediated
normative influence, however.  The first is that Szeremietiew ironically23
referred to Belarus’ military maneuvers and pointed out that Poland would
not respond because of its commitments to NATO’s strategy.  This indicates
that Szeremietiew still believed, even after the social interaction with NATO
officials, that Polish dependence on Western security guarantees was
misguided.  Second, NATO invited Poland to join the alliance in July 1997.
Thus during much of Szeremietiew’s campaign to build political support for
territorial defense, he was aware that NATO’s commitment to Poland was
growing.  Nevertheless, the argument that NATO’s direct confrontation of
territorial defense shifted Polish perceptions away from believing Poland
needed territorial defense is more plausible.
In keeping with the fourth hypothesis, NATO’s exclusive ideology
facilitated Poland’s rejection of territorial defense in 1998.  In addition, in
the wake of this confrontation, it will be still more difficult for Polish policy
makers to pursue similar plans in the future.  Within the confrontation over
OT, supporters of the program tested the limits of NATO’s flexibility.
Because of the demands posed by political legitimacy, Polish politicians
must reconcile their positions with those of the international institutions of
which they hope to remain members.  Increasingly in Europe, national
politicians face two constituencies: one domestic and one international.
Reconciling the constraints of both limits the scope of the domestic political
spectrum.
ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS
With regard to the internationalization of Polish banking, one plausible
alternative approach is the “globalization” thesis.  Jeffry Frieden and Ronald
Rogowski present one version of this thesis in their analytical overview of
how the “exogenous easing of international exchange” provides incentives to
engage the global market. Lower transportation costs, improved
infrastructure, government policy, economies of scale and total factor
productivity have lowered the cost of international transactions, thus raising
the relative price of domestic transactions (Frieden and Rogowski 1996, 26).
Although Frieden and Rogowski are referring to tradable goods throughout
most of the article, they make the point that the logic does not differ
significantly for services and finance.
In the Polish case, this kind of positive political economy would emphasize
the efficiency gains to be reaped from open markets.  This approach
maintains that institutional convergence is the logical outcome given24
economic arguments that suggest market competition accelerates
modernization and ensures efficient capital allocation (Maxfield 1997).
Positive political economy takes the definition of “economic best practice”
for granted, however, without problematizing the political and institutional
context in which that definition has evolved.  In addition, this style of
analysis ignores the debate among domestic and foreign actors that includes
considerations other than economic efficiency.  The evidence in Poland
shows that actors were as concerned with demonstrating their capitalist
credentials as with producing “efficient” outcomes, not least because there
was no initial agreement on what the appropriate emphasis on efficiency
should be  compared to other political objectives.
Both the persuasion/social influence model that I present here and positive
political economy would predict the same outcome for Polish banking—
namely, its internationalization.  However, the two approaches specify
different processes, which are both politically and theoretically important.
The evidence shows that this was not a case of domestic actors responding to
exogenous changes in the international global economy.  Rather,
internationalization of banking in Poland can be explained as a process in
which international financial institutions interpreted market pressure to
Polish politicians.  The IMF, the U.S. Treasury, and the EBRD argued that
market pressures exist, that these market pressures produce certain effects,
that these effects are important in capitalist economies, and that therefore
they should be important to Poland.  Arguments that point to globalization as
the causal mechanism in liberalization tend to understate the range of policy
choice and obscure the political struggles behind those decisions.  Even
given international market pressures to privatize the banking sector, there
was still considerable room for maneuver.  It was political, rather than
economic, pressures, that led to the outcomes under investigation here.
Similarly, Poland’s abandonment of territorial defense challenges rationalist
accounts of state behavior.  Structural realism purports to explain balancing
among states in the international system, and thus a small state’s defense
planning policy falls outside its purview.  However, one can usefully apply
realism’s rationalist assumptions to the Polish case to test the validity of
those assumptions.  If the international system is indeed characterized by
anarchy and if states are self-regarding security maximizers, realists might
predict that Poland would forego territorial defense once the country had
been promised membership in NATO because Polish policy makers would25
reason that their security would be better served by coordinating with the
alliance.
The political process through which Poland fully embraced collective
security strategies in NATO does not bear out this line of reasoning,
however.  There was no agreement, either among Polish policy-makers or
between Polish policy-makers and NATO, about what the salient threat was.
Reconciling these differences was a matter of using persuasion and social
influence to encourage Polish defense officials to publicly articulate the
alliance’s strategic vision as opposed to one that was domestically driven.  It
is important to note in this regard that Poland was already assured
membership in NATO when Szeremietiew made is bid to launch  OT, and
that further, the threat of exclusion from NATO was never used to win
Polish compliance.  Rather it was through persuading politically positioned
defense and foreign policy officials to adopt the alliance’s threat perceptions
that NATO encouraged Poland to internationalize its defense planning.
CONCLUSION
In the course of internationalizing Polish defense and banking, a range of
international institutions pursued broadly similar strategies.  The scope
conditions I used to explain policy implementation that is consistent with
international institutions’ norms draws on recent constructivist contributions
that specify the conditions under which persuasion is most likely to occur.
Because persuasion alone does not indicate when policy implementation or
continuity will result, I have developed a sequencing model that suggests
when international institutions will be able to build on persuasion to ensure
policy implementation or policy continuity. Assuming international
institutions have engaged in persuasion with politically positioned domestic
actors first, they will be able to exercise social influence in subsequent
phases of policy making.  International institutions’ exclusive ideologies
also constrain the range of domestic policy choice because maintaining
legitimacy requires the harmonization of domestic policy with the
international institutional environment.
The two cases differ along three dimensions.  Although they are different
issue areas, my research shows that they are nevertheless both equally
subject to social construction.  The relevance of constructivist analysis is
highlighted further by the fact that finance and security are traditionally
considered to be elemental to national survival.  Second, there were financial26
incentives to comply in the banking case, but no such incentives in the
territorial defense case.  This corroborates my claim that in the banking case,
foreign financial aid was not decisive.  Rather, it was social pressure.
Finally, the key figures in the two cases were subject to slightly different
forms of social influence.  The finance minister avoided “rocking the boat”
when he abandoned bank consolidation, whereas Szeremietiew, the deputy
minister of defense, was overwhelmed by a competing interpretation of the
facts.
Despite these differences, the outcomes are largely the same because
international institutions pursued similar strategies in both cases.  Poland has
internationalized both its defense planning and banking sector in conformity
with international institutions’ ideologies.  Of central importance in this
process was the cultivation of transnational coalitions that included domestic
actors who were legitimate purveyors of the international institutions’
agendas.  This increased the sense of social and political isolation among
politicians who promoted programs that challenged international
institutions’ ideologies.
I have placed strong emphasis here, not just on what actors believe as a
consequence of social interaction, but also on what they say publicly.  The
constructivist concern with persuasion is important because it points to the
non-material structures that inform interstate behavior.  However, it is not
the only way that social forces affect policy outcomes that have
consequences both for domestic and international politics.  Social influence
is a powerful mechanism in the reconciliation of national interests with an
institutionally integrated international environment, such as that which
prevails in Europe in the wake of the cold war.
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1 In contrast to constructivism, contractual institutionalism claims that institutions only
change actors’ strategies, not their interests.  Institutions do this by providing
information, reducing uncertainty, and by changing actors’ cost-benefit calculations with
material incentives.  This is also referred to as “neoliberal institutionalism.”  For27
                                                                                                                                                                                                
exemplary works, see Keohane 1984; Haftendorn, Keohane and Wallander, 1999;
Wallander 1999; and Wallander 2000.
2 Johnston 2001 cites Festinger in Booster 1995,  23-24.
3 Checkel argues that persuasion is most likely to take place if 1) the persuadee is seeking
new information in the wake of policy failure, 2) if the persuadee has few cognitive priors
concerning the issue area, 3) the persuader is a member of an authoritative institution to
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precedents in which less-developed states have caught up exclusively with laissez-faire
policies, though theoretically it could be possible.  But, note two scholars: “It is more
likely, as many recent analyses of the catching-up processes over a wide range of
economies indicate, that the process requires state involvement” (Landesmann and Abel
1995, 146).
7 Ewa Godula notes that “it appears that although OECD member states are formally
entitled to have unlimited access to other members’ banking markets, in reality there is
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foreign ownership in their banking sectors, with few exceptions.  The Economist notes
that “In some countries inside the European Union, financial regulators strive diligently
to prevent foreigners from buying local banks.  But in the East European candidates for
EU membership, they lay out a welcome mat.”
8 This discussion is based on the author’s interview with former International Finance
Corporation official A, Warsaw, October 8, 1999.
9 ING invested both in Bank Slaski S.A. in Katowice (controlling) and Bank Powszechny
Handlowy (BPH) in Krakow (14% as of 1999).  UniCredito eventually bought a
controlling share in Pekao S.A.
10 Note that the World Bank was initially skeptical of the idea because it had not been
tested, and also, in all likelihood, because it was coming from the IFC, which has a long-
standing rivalry with the World Bank.  Author’s interview former IFC official A.
11 Author’s interview with high level World Bank representative in Poland, 1990-1994,
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Polish Ministry of Finance official A, Warsaw, November 2, 1999.
15 The following discussion is based on the author’s interview with former Polish
Minister of Finance A, Washington, D.C., February 18, 2000.
16 In a similar vein, Vladimir Popov argues that government policies (he surveys “shock
therapy” versus “gradualism”) may be inconsequential to economic performance in
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economy and the degree of distortion (in agriculture and industry) to world markets at the
time of transition (Popov, forthcoming).
17 By 2000, the EU hoped that member and aspirant countries would agree to the freedom
to establish financial institutions in member countries, the “freedom of services across
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argued further in this article that, contrary to conventional wisdom, national defense is
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22 Proponents of territorial defense compared Poland’s contemporary security
arrangements with those in 1939.  The weeklong resistance at Westerplatte against the
Germans proved that with relatively few and light arms, Poland could mount a successful
defense against surprise attacks.  Moreover, the West’s failure to abide its security
commitments reinforced the conviction among defense planners that Poland should
develop an independent military capability regardless of NATO security guarantees
implicit in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.
23 Author’s interview with Polish defense and foreign policy official A, former Deputy
Minister of Foreign Affairs; former Deputy Minister of Defense, Warsaw, August 4,
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24 Authors’ interviews with Polish defense and foreign policy official B, formerly of the
Sejm Defense Committee and Polish Ministry of Defense, Warsaw, August 16, 1999; and
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